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THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY
AND HUMAN FREEDOM
William L. Rowe

According to the Westminster Confession, "God from all eternity did ...
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet ... thereby neither is God the author of sin or is violence offered to the will of the creatures."
It is hard to see how these two points can be consistently maintained. Hugh
McCann, however, argues that by placing God's decisions outside of time, both
propositions are perfectly consistent. I agree with McCann that God's determining decisions do not make him the author of our sins. But I think that
God's determining decisions, whether temporal or outside of time, preclude
our possessing the libertarian free will that McCann's believes we do possess.
In fact, so I argue, if we possess libertarian free will, then elevating God's
determining decisions outside of time only results in God's eternal decisions
being within our power to determine.

According to the Westminster Confession, "God from all eternity did ...
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass."l This remarkable expression of God's total sovereignty over all that comes to pass might
seem to make God the creator of the moral evil in the world. Moreover, it
might also seem to preclude any free will on the part of his creatures. For if
God has from all eternity unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to
pass, it is hard to see how it can ever be genuinely up to us what we shall
do or even decide to do. These two rather disturbing results that may
appear to follow from such an uncompromising affirmation of God's
absolute sovereignty did not, of course, escape the notice of the framers of
the Westminster Confession. For they hasten to add in the very next sentence: "Yet ... thereby neither is God the author of sin or is violence offered
to the will of the creatures."
Recently, Hugh McCann has also endorsed a view of God's total sovereignty over all that comes to pass. 2 He sees as a merit of this view that it satisfies the principle of sufficient reason with respect to our free decisions. For
although our reasons do not provide a full explanation of our free decisions,
God's deciding that we shall so decide does provide a full explanation of
our free decisions, and God has sufficient reasons for deciding that we shall
so decide. In addition, McCann endeavors to show by careful analysis and
argument that such an uncompromising affirmation of God's absolute sovereignty has neither of the consequences that the Westminster Confession
assures us it does not have: neither is God himself thereby morally evil or
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the author of sin, nor does God's total sovereignty deprive his creatures of
libertarian freedom. I propose to evaluate the success of his efforts to establish these two important claims.
I shall be very brief concerning whether God must be morally evil, or the
author of sin, if he decides that I shall make a sinful or morally evil decision.
McCann is right: the answer is no. It does follow, I believe, that God is
responsible for the existence of a morally evil decision, but the morally evil
decision is mine, not God's, as McCann points out. Jonathan Edwards gave
the very same response to the question of whether God is the author of sin. 3
I do want to discuss more fully McCann's views on whether God's exercising total sovereignty over all our decisions has the merit of fully satisfying the principle of sufficient reason without endangering libertarian freedom. I'll begin by saying something about the issue as it arises in the
Westminster Confession.
If God has ordained from all eternity every decision I shall make, how
can it sometimes be up to me what I shall decide? Jonathan Edwards was
not deeply troubled by this problem because he did not believe that we possess libertarian freedom. But it is difficult to see how someone who believes
in libertarian freedom can agree with the view of total divine sovereignty
expressed in the Westminster Confession. Thomas Reid, for example, was a
good Presbyterian who accepted libertarian freedom. I don't think he could
have fully accepted the account of divine sovereignty presented in the
Westminster Confession. For the idea there seems to be that before I even
existed God had already decreed exactly what decisions I would make. But
how then can it have been genuinely in my power to decide to do something other than what I did decide, or not to decide to do what God has
already decreed I shall decide to do? If God already decreed what decisions
I would make, then my decision was necessitated by his earlier decree and
it cannot have been in my power to decide otherwise. Since Reid would
think that some of my decisions are genuinely up to me, I doubt that he
could have believed that before I existed God unchangeably decreed each
and every decision I shall make. Does Reid then deny that God is sovereign
over his creatures? Not in any really significant way. For the power we possess over our acts of will is quite limited. And our possession of this power
is moment by moment at God's discretion. For this power is given to us by
God and he may enlarge it, diminish it, or discontinue it as he sees fit. As
Reid remarks:
No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. His hook
is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and, when he
pleases, can restrain it, or tum it whithersoever he will. Let this be
always understood when we ascribe liberty to man, or to any created
being. 4
Perhaps we can say that Reid holds a moderate sort of divine sovereignty.
Not all of our decisions are fully determined or explained by God's decisions, for he has given us power over some of our decisions. Extreme divine
sovereignty holds that absolutely all of our decisions are fully determined
by God's determining decision that we shall so decide.
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McCann thinks there is a version of extreme divine sovereignty that is
fully consistent with libertarian freedom. The chief difference between the
version he advocates and that which I've attributed to the Westminster
Confession concerns whether God's determining decrees or decisions occur
at a time earlier than the decisions of ours that are determined by God's
decisions. By taking God's creative act in deciding what our decisions shall
be as itself not a temporal act, McCann believes he can postulate a full,
determining account of each of our decisions without depriving us of the
power to decide otherwise. And it is not difficult to see what he has in
mind. If there is no divine decision that occurs temporally prior to our decisions, then the problem we confronted with the Westminster Confession
does not seem to arise. Of course, McCann is faced with the problem of
explaining how there can be decisions that occur at no time whatever. He
also has the problem of explaining how these timeless decisions can fully
determine decisions that occur in time. Reid could make little sense of such
ideas. But allowing that McCann's view of God's timeless decisions is
coherent, the problem of how we can have control over decisions that God
timelessly determines seems to vanish. But two problems, I believe, do
emerge in its place: first, the problem of how God's total sovereignty can be
maintained; second, the problem of whether McCann's view can ultimately
satisfy the principle of sufficient reason. I'll begin with the first of these.
It is necessarily true that I shall decide what God timelessly wills that I
shall decide. But if at some time prior to my decision it isJlp to me what decision I shall make, then it must be up to me what God timelessly wills that I
shall decide. If it is in my power to decide to vacation this winter in Colorado
or New York, but not both, then it must be up to me whether God timelessly
wills that I shall decide to vacation in Colorado or timelessly wills that I shall
decide to vacation in New York. Once we insist that for every decision we
make God timelessly wills that we shall so decide, I don't see how this conclusion can be avoided. But I suspect McCann would view our conclusion as
compromising God's absolute sovereignty over my decisions. For instead of
God's hook being in my nose, it now appears that my hook is in God's nose.
God's absolute sovereignty is meant to preclude the creature's having power
over what God wills. But, to repeat the point, once we insist on a logical connection between what J decide and what God timelessly decides I shall
decide, we can sustain genuine libertarian freedom over some of our decisions only by placing what God timelessly decides within our power. So, if
we want to insist that what God timelessly decides is not in our control, I
don't think we can possibly say, as McCann does, both that we have libertarian freedom with respect to some of our decisions and that for every decision
we make God timelessly wills that we shall so decide.
The second problem concerns the satisfaction of the principle of sufficient reason. If I freely decide to vacation in Colorado this winter, as
opposed to vacationing in New York, McCann says that my reasons for so
deciding do not constitute a full explanation of my decision. But he thinks
that God's decision that I shall so decide does provide a full explanation of
my decision. For God will surely have sufficient reasons for deciding that I
shall decide to vacation in Colorado. Thus we seem to be left with no
embarrassing exception to the principle of sufficient reason. But is this really
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so? After all, it was in my power to have decided to vacation this winter in
New York. Suppose I had made that decision. Would there then have been
a full explanation of it? McCann will say yes. For there would then have
been God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation this winter in
New York. And, of course, God would have had sufficient reasons for so
deciding. But the question I want to ask is this: who determines which of
these divine decisions is actual? As I've already indicated, given libertarian
freedom it seems to me that I do. Look at it this way. There is the state of
affairs consisting of God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation in
Colorado, and there is the state of affairs consisting of God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation in New York. It is up to me which of
these two states of affairs is actual. For which of them is actual depends on
how I resolve my deliberations. And it is in my power to resolve them by
deciding to vacation in Colorado, and also in my power to resolve them by
deciding to vacation in New York. That being so, we can hardly explain
why I concluded my deliberations by deciding as I did by appealing to the
actuality of one of these states of affairs about God's timeless decisions. If
anything, the explanation goes the other way. It is my resolving my deliberations as I did that figures in the explanation of why the state of affairs consisting in God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation in Colorado
is actual, rather than the state of affairs consisting in God's timeless decision
that I shall decide to vacation in New York. Thus, I'm very doubtful that
McCann has succeeded in his efforts to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason by providing a full explanation for our free decisions in terms of God's
timeless decisions.
In conclusion, it does seem to me that McCann has forcefully and ingeniously argued for the perfect harmony of three ideas: (1) God's absolute
control over every decision his creatures make, (2) the requirement of the
principle of sufficient reason that there be a full explanation even for our
free decisions, and (3) the requirement of libertarian freedom that it is sometimes genuinely in our power to have decided and acted otherwise.
Moreover, it seems to me that he has made significant progress on the path
to establishing that goal. But, for the reasons given, I very much doubt that
it is a goal that can possibly be attained.
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